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I.

INTRODUCTION

Preemption of state law is becoming an increasingly debated issue
as federal regulation expands into more areas of our lives.' Some federal legislation explicitly provides for federal preemption of state statutory and/or common law. The Copyright Act of 1976 is one such piece
of legislation. Section 301 of the Copyright Act provides for preemption
of all equivalent state law. Traditionally, copyright law has had a tremendous impact on competition in intellectual property; in the latter
half of this century, society has become concerned with protecting technological innovations. Section 301's preemption of state law consequently impacts on the states' rights to protect the use of technological
innovations by competitors/interlopers.
* Ms. Kemp is an Associate Professor of Business Law, Department of Finance, at
Louisiana State University, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

1. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), mandamus
denied, 822 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987) (Cigarette Labelling
Act); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 238
(1984) (Atomic Energy Act); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987)

(Cigarette Labelling Act); Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co., 589 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (Nuclear Regulatory Act); Chappell v. SCA Serv., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1087 (C.D. Ill.
1982) (Toxic Substances Control Act).
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Intellectual property rights have long been protected concurrently
by federal and state law. Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'2 Pursuant to that clause, Congress has enacted copyright3 and patent statutes, the most recent being the Copyright Act of 1976.
However, even before the Supreme Court's 1834 decision in "heaton v. Peters,4 the states' power to protect intellectual property when
the federal law does not speak has been recognized. 5 Until the Copyright Act of 1976, the United States essentially had a dual copyright system.6 The federal law protected published works while the state
common law protected unpublished works. Since 1978, the effective
date of the Copyright Act, the dual system of copyright has been abolished and all works of authorship, whether published or unpublished,
are regulated by the Copyright Act.
States continue to protect intellectual property less directly under a
variety of statutory and common law causes of action including: trade
secret law, unfair competition law, contract law, and tort law (e.g., misappropriation, conversion, invasion of privacy and right of publicity). In
addition, states statutorily regulate areas that touch upon copyright,
such as the motion picture licensing regulations. 7 These causes of action have nothing intrinsically to do with intellectual property or works
of authorship, nor with copying and distributing such works. Hence,
there is no reason to suspect that all of these causes of action are pre2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982).

4. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
5. Francione, The CaliforniaArt PreservationAct and FederalPreemption, 31 Copy.
RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 105, 118-19 (1984) [hereinafter Francione].

6. See H.R.
& ADMIN.

CONG.

REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131, reprinted
NEWS 5659 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].

in 1976 U.S.

CODE

Instead of a dual system of "common law copyright" for unpublished works and
statutory copyright for published works, which has been the system in effect in
the United States since the first copyright statute in 1790, the bill adopts a single
system of Federal statutory copyright from creation.
Id.
7. See, e.g., Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982),
on remand, 614 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 933 (1987); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.
Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Warner Bros. v.
Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D.C. Utah 1981), appeal dismissed, 782 F.2d 136 (10th Cir.
1985). All three cases found that similar state statutes regulating the bidding on newly
released motion pictures were not preempted by the Copyright Act. Somehow, regulating
the manner of marketing copyrighted works does not interfere impermissibly with the
copyright holder's exclusive right to distribute her work.
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empted by the Copyright Act. Yet state law actions have been used as
avenues of relief for violations of rights very similar to those addressed
in the Copyright Act.
This paper examines the application of section 301 to claims arising
under state law. The writer concludes that Congress did not make its
intentions sufficiently clear for the courts to agree on the scope of the
Copyright Act's preemption section.
II.

THE PURPOSE AND APPLICATION OF COPYRIGHT

The policy behind copyright and patent is to provide incentive for
creativity and invention by giving authors and inventors a limited monopoly in the marketing of their works and inventions. This limited
monopoly serves to enhance collective public knowledge by allowing
communication of creative expressions and ideas and the use of inventions. The policy contains an inherent conflict in that "monopoly"
implies exclusivity while "collective public knowledge" implies unrestricted dissemination. Hence, the law of copyright and patent involves the balancing of competing interests to achieve the maximum
benefit to both individual and public. Too little control over dissemination would presumably result in too little reward for the individual, and
thus, the individual would have too little incentive and would stop producing. Too much control on dissemination would presumably result in
a lack of dissemination to the public.
The initial question is, Why does a plaintiff claim violation of a
state law or common law in addition to claiming copyright infringement? The reason is not that damages under the copyright law are inadequate; in fact, a plaintiff proving infringement of copyright need not
show actual damages, as statutory damages are provided in the Act.
The reason for filing a state claim is usually that the plaintiff does not
have the protection of the federal copyright law, as her claim "falls between the cracks." A brief examination of copyright law will clarify the
situation.
Copyright protects the author's right to copy and distribute her
original creations of authorship that are "fixed in a tangible medium of
expression."
The Copyright Act refers to authors' creations as
"works," 9 and thus, when discussing copyright issues, it is often said
that copyright protects the author's right to copy and distribute copies
of her copyrighted work. However, the Copyright Act does not offer
the copyright holder complete control over her creations. First, the
idea/expression dichotomy, as created in Baker v. Selden'-o and devel8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
9. Id.
10. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
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oped in numerous cases since that time, 1 provides that copyright only
protects the author's expression, but not her ideas, which are free as the
air. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,12 Judge Learned Hand established a test which became the Second Circuit's approach to copyright infringement law; his test is known as the "abstractions test."
Under this test, ideas, themes, and facts may be copied from another's
work, without resulting in infringement of copyright. Hence, in addition to proving that the work is copyrighted, the plaintiff must also
prove infringement of the copyright, which involves proving her expression was copied.
If the author cannot prove copying by direct evidence, she must
prove defendant had access to her work, and that the defendant's work
is substantially similar to her work. This is referred to as "the substantial similarity test."'1 3 There are two problems with the substantial similarity test. The first is that the test varies among circuit courts. The
second is that the test varies according to the type of work which, allegedly, is being copied. The defendant's work may be quite similar to the
original author's work, yet not be infringing. This problem particularly
arises in fact works, such as directories, maps, data bases, historical narratives, and indexes-in short, works which theoretically require very
little creative effort. The cases indicate, however, that screenplays,
novels, treatises, and such, may also be quite similar and yet not in14
fringe on one another.
11. [string cite needed]
12. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
13. [cite needed]
14. E.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 784
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) (movie "Fort Apache: The Bronx"
did not infringe book "Fort Apache" due to no copying of expression); Suid v. Newsweek
Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980) (magazine article about John Wayne did not infringe John Wayne biography, even though biography was used, because facts are not protected by copyright); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (film of Hindenberg explosion did not infringe historical
book on Hindenberg explosion, even though historian's theory used, because facts and
ideas not protected by copyright); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assoc., 486 F. Supp. 1273
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (toys that
express same idea will necessarily be similar, but mechanical aspects of toys are not copyrightable); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd mem., 738 F.2d 419
(2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's screenplay not infringed by movie "Stir Crazy" due to no substantial similarity); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's script entitled "The Adventures of Rainbow Island" not infringed by "Rainbow
Brite" products, due to no substantial similarity of expression); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (substantial similarity requires not only similarity of ideas, but also of the expression of the ideas); Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985) (musical play
"Lokey from Maldemar" about endearing extraterrestrial not infringed by movie "E.T. The Extra Terrestrial" about same).
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For example, a movie about an endearing extraterrestrial who befriends two children and delivers a love message to the world does not
automatically infringe a play about an endearing extraterrestrial who
befriends two children and delivers a love message to the world.15 The
fact that one is a movie and the other a play does not save the movie
from infringing. The fact that there was a change in media simply
means a derivative work may have been created, and derivative works
can violate an original author's copyright. 16 The reason the movie will
not infringe the author's copyright is if it only copies the playwriter's
ideas and not her expression.
In brief, the inevitable application of the idea/expression dichotomy
to copyright infringement claims causes copyright law to leave some
gaps in the protection of intellectual property. The next question is,
Should these gaps be filled in by state law or should a competitor be
permitted to borrow freely from another's work, so long as the competitor does not copy the expression?
III.

THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE

The supremacy clause 17 in the United States Constitution has long
insured that federal preemption of state regulation be considered by the
courts. In Hines v. Davidowitz,i8 the Supreme Court said preemption
will occur, first, when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, has expressed a clear intent to preempt state law; second, when it is clear, despite the absence of explicit preemptive language, that Congress has
intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an entire field of
regulation; and, finally, when compliance with both state and federal
law is impossible, or when the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'19 Section 301 falls within the first category: the expression
of a clear intent to preempt state law. Section 301 provides in relevant
part:
(a) ...[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that.. .come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103... are governed exclusively by this title. . . .[N]o person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of
any State.
15. Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1352.

16. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
18. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
19. Id. at 67. The Supreme Court recently affirmed Hines, in Capital Cities Cable,

Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights... under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter
of copyright .. or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright as specified by section 106.20
However explicitly Congress provided for preemption in section
301, the breadth of the section's application is in no way clear. It is apparent that the second and third prongs of the Hines test need not even
be considered in a section 301 analysis, since section 301 seems, on its
face, to preempt state law. However, it should be noted that the third
prong, actual conflict with the purposes of the federal copyright law, is
usually the dominant consideration in deciding preemption under section 301.21 Still, cases considering preemption by federal law where the
preemption clause is either nonexistent or at least not so encompassing,
cite section 301 as an example of an instance where Congress has
clearly preempted all state law.22 Why then do the federal courts refuse to preempt all state law protection of intellectual property? The
answer is found by examining the language of section 301, the legislative history of section 301, and the law on preemption prior to enactment of section 301.
IV.

HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION

Section 301 did not spring forth from the collective mind of Congress fully formed, but was the latest development in an already confusing area of law. Two Supreme Court decisions established a very broad
preemption of state law by federal patent and copyright law. In Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,23 and its companion case, Compco Corp. v.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
21. Francione, supra note 5, at 139-40. But see Jorgensen & McIntyre-Cecil, The
Evolution of the Preemption Doctrineand Its Effect on Common Law Remedies, 19 IDAHO
L. REV. 85, 100 (1983) ("congressional preemption is much broader than any attempt at
preemption on constitutional grounds enunciated by the Supreme Court") [hereinafter
Jorgensen]; Note, Copyright Preemption:Effecting the Analysis Prescribedby Section 301,
24 B.C.L. REV. 963, 964 (1983) ("Prior to the 1976 Act, copyright preemption was based on
judicial interpretations of the range and effect of the copyright and supremacy clauses of
the United States Constitution.") [hereinafter Copyright Preemption].
22. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), mandamus denied,
822 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 U.S. 907 (1987) (Cigarette Labelling Act);

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 238 (1984)
(Atomic Energy Act); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987) (Cigarette

Labelling Act); Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co., 589 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(Nuclear Regulatory Act).

23. 376 U.S. 225 (1964), reh'g denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
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Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court held that state law may
not prohibit the copying of a product or work that is unprotected by a
patent or copyright. Both cases involved inventions that were not sufficiently novel to obtain patent protection. In each case, the plaintiff had
claimed that since its patent was invalid, the state unfair competition
law prohibiting misappropriation should provide relief for the injury
caused by the defendant's marketing of a copied product. The Court
found that state actions for palming off or passing off would not be preempted by its holdings in Sears/Compco.25 The rationale behind the
Court's holdings was that public interest in free access to ideas and free
competition had been carefully balanced under the federal patent and
copyright schemes against the inventor and author's economic incentive
to create. The Court further reasoned that to permit states to remove
from the public domain that which the federal law had decided was not
sufficiently creative to be protected would clash with the federal pur26
pose behind patent and copyright.
The Sears/Compco decisions caused problems immediately, primarily because the Supreme Court had, thirty-five years earlier, in International News Service v. Associated Press,27 (Int'l News) recognized a
cause of action for misappropriation of news stories by a competitor.
There had been no attempt to register the news stories for copyright because of the sheer volume of stories that were constantly being dispatched. In Int'l News, the Court, applying federal common law,
afforded protection against misappropriation (i.e., copying of the information gathered by the plaintiff), until such time as the plaintiff had
gained its economic advantage. 28 When Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins 29 abolished the federal common law, the states took it upon
themselves to follow in the footsteps of Int'l News and grant the
broadest protection for unfair competition, where previously the action
had been only for palming off/passing off. Did Sears/Compco overrule
24. 376 U.S. 234 (1964), reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
25. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232.
26. Id. See also Jorgensen, supra note 21, at 89; Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 45,
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987) (No. 87-3516), aff'd,
847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).

27. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
28. Copyright protection is usually granted for the life of the natural author plus fifty
years, no matter what the subject matter of the copyright involves. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(1982) (but see § 302(b),(c) for a few exceptions). Years ago, Professor Robert Gorman advocated creating copyright that was for shorter periods of time for certain types of works,
such as news stories. Congress has not seen fit to invoke a flexible copyright time
scheme. Gorman, Copyright Protectionfor the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1605 (1963).

29. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Int7 News? Congress thinks it did not. 30
The Sears/Compco decisions caused much confusion in the states'
application of state unfair competition laws, particularly misappropriation, to intellectual property and technological innovations. 3' The
Supreme Court limited the broad language of Sears/Compco in Goldstein v. California.32 The facts in Goldstein invited such a limitation.
The 1909 Copyright Act contained a list of works subject to copyright
protection. Even though the legislation said that works include the
listed categories, the courts interpreted the list to be exclusive. Sound
recordings, not having been invented in 1909, were not included in the
list of copyrightable matter. As a result, courts were not protecting
records and tapes from being copied by anyone who so chose to copy.
California, where much of the record industry was located, acted to prevent record piracy. It was illegal under the California statute to make a
tape of a record. Goldstein violated the statute and was prosecuted, but
claimed that the California law was preempted by the federal copyright
law. He asserted that under Sears/Compco, if the subject matter is not
covered by copyright, it may be freely copied by all, without impunity.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court noted that Congress had
finally acted to make sound recordings copyrightable, so that had the
copying occurred later, it would have been copyright infringement and
remediable under the copyright law. At any rate, the Court established
a mode of analysis to determine whether the state statute would conflict with federal law. If Congress failed to protect subject matter that
would otherwise be protected by copyright, the states were free to protect such works. If, on the other hand, the state law attempted to protect that which Congress had indicated should be public domain and
33
free from any restraints, the state law would be preempted.
Had that been all, courts could have found that the Sears/Compco
and Goldstein holdings were consistent. Goldstein did not purport to
overrule Sears/Compco. Subject matter that would be copyrightable,
but for a quirk of Congress, could be protected by state law, while a
work that statutorily qualified for copyright but failed to meet the origi30. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5659. In describing the intended effect of Section 301, the report embraces Sears/Compco, but then protects situations such as the one
in Int'l News from being preempted.
31. Jorgensen, supra note 21, at 90.
32. 412 U.S. 546, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973). The Eleventh Circuit decided that
Goldstein was superseded by the 1976 Copyright Act, § 301. Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d
1224 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
33. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implicationfor Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y,
U.S.A. 560, 601 (1982) [hereinafter Fact or Fancy.; Copyright Preemption,supra note 21,
at 977; Jorgensen, supra note 21, at 95; Francione, supra note 5, at 120; Maher, The
Shrink-Wrap License: Old Problems In A New Wrapper, 34 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y, U.S.A.
292, 309 (1987).
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nality requirement of copyrightability could not be protected by state
law. In addition, ideas and other public domain items contained in a
copyrightable work may not be protected by state law because they
must be free to all, since public policy favors the broadest dissemination
and use of ideas, facts, discoveries and systems.
The Goldstein limitation of Sears/Compco would have been manageable by the courts if the Supreme Court, subsequent to Goldstein,
had not applied an even narrower preemption standard to state law protecting trade secrets.

In

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,3 4

the

Supreme Court held that state trade secret law is not preempted by
federal patent law, even when the secret being protected is patentable. 35 Trade secrets are defined as ideas, facts, processes, systems, or
methods, and are precisely the type of subject matter excluded from
copyright protection by the 1976 Copyright Act. 36 The logical conclusion is that Kewanee must be limited to patent law and has no application to copyright law. However, trade secrecy is considered a viable
means of supplementing copyright protection, particularly in copyrightable technology such as computer software.
The question in light of section 301 is, What effect has section 301
had on the above Supreme Court decisions? An excellent application of
the three cases, Sears/Compco, Goldstein, and Kewanee, is contained in
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co. 37 Synercom
claimed that University Computing (UC) had violated its copyrights and
engaged in unfair competition by substantially copying its computeruser manuals and its software program. The Texas District Court, in a
separate opinion, had found that UC had violated Synercom's copyright
in its user manual, but that UC had not violated Synercom's copyright
in its computer program, since all that UC copied were "ideas. ''38 The
district court also considered Synercom's claim of misappropriation
under Texas common law-similar to the type recognized in Int'l News.
Applying Sears/Compco the court said that the appropriated input formats were writings within copyright law, embodying ideas which were
not protected by copyright. They therefore were "not matters left 'unattended' by Congress." 39 Applying Goldstein, the court concluded that
34. 416 U.s. 470 (1974).
35. Id. at 490. See also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (whether a patent licensee may challenge a patent's validity); Jorgensen, supra note 21, at 96; Copyright Pre-

emption, supra note 21, at 976.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,

concept, principle, or discovery").
37. 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
38. Synercom Tech. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1011-14 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
39. Synercom, 474 F. Supp. at 43 (emphasis in the original).
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Texas law would place a restraint on the use of an idea or concept, in
direct conflict with the federal copyright law.40 The court distinguished
Kewanee on two grounds: first, the trade secret in Kewanee did not prohibit all use of the technology, as reverse engineering would still be
available; and second, Kewanee involved a law that addressed ethical
41
conduct more than the use of ideas and concepts.
V.

THE TWO PRONG TEST OF SECTION 301

Section 301 has been almost universally interpreted to provoke a
two-tiered inquiry. First, does the subject matter fall within section
102?42 Second, is the right being protected by the state law equivalent
43
to the exclusive rights listed in section 106?

Granted, it is often simpler for a court to analyze a fact situation
when the statutory law being applied is broken down into its constituent parts, but such practice may result in losing sight of the forest for
the trees. In a sense, the cases interpreting section 301 fall prey to this
danger. Far more emphasis is placed on the second prong, which has
resulted in a lack of development of a clearly established doctrine affirming that ideas may not be protected by state law. Additionally, the
second prong has become equated with an extra elements test, which
leaves unanswered a whole line of inquiry regarding the interplay of
section 106 and the limitations on the exclusive rights stated in sections
107 through 118 of the Copyright Act.
A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

As is typical of legislative reports accompanying passage of statutes,
the legislative history further confuses rather than clarifies application
of section 301 to specific fact situations. Nevertheless, a substantial
number of courts have reviewed the legislative history of section 301,
predominantly to determine what Congress meant when it used the
' '44
term "equivalent right.
40. Id. at 43-44.
41. Id. at 44.

42. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
43. Id. § 106.
44. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663, 675 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987); Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d
1224, 1225 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood &
Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Warrington Assoc., Inc. v. Real-Time
Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enter., 501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in relevant part, 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes,
496 F. Supp. 408, 444 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982); Meyers v.
Waverly Fabrics, 65 N.Y.2d 75; 479 N.E.2d 236, 238 (1985).
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The first version of section 301 contained a list of state law causes
of action which would not be preempted by federal copyright law.
When a proposed draft attempted to add misappropriation to the list,
the ensuing debate resulted in the list being completely eliminated.
However, the House Report accompanying passage of the current version of section 301 does list certain state causes of action that would not
be preempted. 4 5 Two aspects of the House Report are revealing,
although neither answers questions that arise in real fact situations.
First, as regards subject matter, the House Report states that section 301 has a preemptive effect even if the work "fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in
originality to qualify. '4 6 From this statement and a later reference to
Sears/Compco, one can postulate that if there is a work of authorship
that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, the copyright law exclusively governs rights of copying and distributing any aspects of the
work. Hence, if one takes ideas from one work to produce another, that
taking is not copyright infringement and may not be prohibited by state
47
law. However, that has not necessarily been the result in the cases.
Second, the House Report also elucidates another aspect of section
301: the definition of nonequivalent rights.
The evolving common law rights of "privacy," "publicity," and trade
secrets, and the general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain
unaffected as long as the causes of action contain elements, such as an
invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that
are different in kind from copyright infringement. Nothing in the bill
derogates from the rights of48parties to contract with each other and to
sue for breaches of contract.
Professor Nimmer has defined the so-called equivalent rights test as an
extra element test. 49 That definition has been refined in the leading
case on preemption by copyright law, Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc. v.
50
Nation Enterprises.
The court required the state law claim to "establish qualitatively different conduct on the part of the infringing
party." 51 Stating an extra element not required to be proved in a copyright infringement case, such as intent to appropriate the subject matter
by the infringing party, would not be sufficient to survive preemption.
The House Report, however, does not make this distinction to the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5745-47.
Id.
See infra note 54 (particularly the cases cited in the second paragraph).
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5748.
1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] (1989).
501 F. Supp. 848, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in relevant part, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.

1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
51. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 201.
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degree that the courts following the Second Circuit and Harper & Row
do. For instance, misappropriation, as established in Int7 News, had
previously been recognized by state courts as protectible under common
and statutory law. The tort includes the intentional appropriation of
another's facts or ideas for one's own commercial gain, to the injury of
the plaintiff. Since state law may not protect the aspects of an otherwise copyrightable work that are expressly excluded from copyright,
such as ideas and facts, it would appear that Int'l News is preempted by
section 301. Nevertheless, the House Report states otherwise:
[S]tate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy.. .against a
consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of the
facts (i.e., not the literary expression) constituting "hot" news, whether
in the traditional mold of [Int7 News] or in the newer form of data up52
dates from scientific, business, or financial data bases.
In effect, the legislature has embraced two contradictory and irreconcilable doctrines. The Sears/Compco doctrine permits states to protect public domain intellectual property only by the unfair competition
tort of passing off or palming off. The Int' News doctrine permits the
states to protect public domain intellectual property by the unfair competition tort of misappropriation, i.e., copying and distributing public domain facts. Copying and distributing are the very rights protected by
copyright law. When the legislature, responsible for the statute, contradicts itself, it is not surprising to learn that courts experience substantial confusion when applying section 301 to a multitude of fact
situations.
B.

THE FIRST PRONG EXAMINED

The first prong of section 301 provides for preemption of subject
matter that is within section 102.5 3 Section 102 contains Congress' approval of the judicially developed idea/expression dichotomy. A large
52. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5748.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Section 102 provides:

(a) Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.... Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2)
(3)

musical works...
dramatic works...

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

pantomimes and choreographic works;
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
sound recordings.

(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such

work.
Id. § 102.
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number of cases where the plaintiff has claimed violation of state common or statutory law, in addition to copyright infringement, involve situations where the aspects taken from the plaintiff's copyrighted work
are not protected by copyright under the idea/expression dichotomy.
The ensuing question then is, If ideas are subject matter within the
scope of section 102, and Congress has pronounced that ideas are not
copyrightable, is section 301's language sufficient to preempt state law
that would protect those ideas from being free as the air? There appears to be a lack of consensus in the cases that have had to answer this
question.5 4 Fortunately, most courts considering preemption do not
face this issue squarely, since most works are copyrightable subject matter, even if the ideas contained in the works are not. Professor Gorman
thinks the protection of ideas should be preempted by copyright law
under his interpretation of Sears/Compco and Goldstein.55 On the other
hand, some courts and commentators believe that section 301 has over56
ruled Goldstein.
54. Most cases indicate that state law may not protect facts, ideas, systems and
processes. This is consistent with the Sears/Compco doctrine. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), appeal after remand, 810 F.2d
104 (6th Cir. 1987); Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980); Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980);
Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 645 F. Supp. 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Towle
Mfg. Co. v. Godinger Silver Art Co. 612 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Smith v. Weinstein,
578 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd mem., 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1984); Videotronics,
Inc. v. Bend Elec., 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D.C. Nevada 1983); Schuchart & Assoc., Professional
Eng'rs v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Tex. 1982); Klitzner Indus. v. H. K.
James & Co., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F.
Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980); Harper & Row, 501 F. Supp. 848; Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Pub.
Co., 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co.,
474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979); George P. Ballas Buick-GMC, Inc. v. Taylor Buick, Inc., 5
Ohio Misc.2d 16; 449 N.E.2d 805 (1981), aff'd, 5 Ohio App.3d 71, 449 N.E.2d 503 (1982).
Other cases indicate that there may be circumstances when ideas and the like will be
protected by state law in spite of copyright law forbidding protection. Generally these instances are when allegations of contract rights, confidential relationships, or lack of public
disclosure are involved. See, e.g., Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir.
1988); Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984), appeal after remand, 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986) (ideas
may be protected through implied contract); Southern Miss. Planning & Dev. Dist., Inc. v.
Robertson, 660 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (protection of undisclosed ideas through
trade secret law); Past Pluto Prod. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Rand McNally
& Co. v. Fleet Mgmt. Sys., 591 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ill. 1983); P.I.T.S. Films v. Laconis, 588
F. Supp. 1383 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 451
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Warrington Assoc., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (protection for undisclosed ideas); J.D. Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361
(E.D. Pa. 1979).
55. Fact or Fancy?,supra note 33, at 560.
56. Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819
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THE SECOND PRONG EXAMINED

The second prong of equivalent rights is more frequently discussed
by the courts. The Second Circuit has applied a broad federal preemption, while the other circuits are less clear.
The second part of section 301 says that copyright law preempts all
state statutory and common law that creates rights equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights in section 106. 5 7 The exclusive rights enumerated
in section 106 have been interpreted broadly. For example, a state law
claim in the Second Circuit that is qualitatively similar to these exclusive rights is preempted.

58

However, section 106 has a provision analogous to section 102(b).
Recall that section 102(b) provided for certain aspects of an otherwise
copyrightable work (e.g., ideas, systems, and processes) that were not
copyrightable. Similarly, section 106 qualifies the exclusive rights list
by saying the list is subject to sections 107 through 118, described as limitations on the exclusive rights stated in section 106.
If a state law were to impose limitations on section 106's exclusive
rights, beyond the limitations stated in sections 107 through 118 or in
the reverse situation, in contravention of the Copyright Act's limitations on the owner's exclusive rights, would these limitations also preempt the state law? State law includes the copyright owner's right to
qualify or annul the Copyright Act limitations by contractual agreement. For example, section 109, 5 9 commonly known as the first sale

doctrine and originally judicially created, provides that the rightful
owner of a copy of a copyrighted work may dispose of the copy by sale
or otherwise, without the consent of the copyright owner. Yet the legislative comment accompanying the section permits the copyright owner
to place contractual conditions on future disposition of the copy and enforce the conditions in an action for breach of contract. 60 In addition,
(1984); Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford University, 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va.
1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988); Francione, supra note
5, at 120. But see Schuchart, 540 F. Supp. 928; Association of Am. Med. Colleges v. Carey,
482 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); F.E.L. Publications v. National Conf. of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034 (N.D. Ill.
1978).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The exclusive rights in section 106 are:
(1) to reproduce copies;
(2) to prepare derivative works;
(3) to distribute copies;
(4) to perform publicly; and
(5) to display publicly.
Id. § 106.
58. Harper & Row, 501 F. Supp. at 848.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
60. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982) (permitting the owner of a copy to dispossess it,
presumably by rental, lease or otherwise). The legislative comment accompanying § 109
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courts have recognized that the first sale doctrine does not apply when
the copy is licensed rather than actually sold.6 ' Based on legislative and
judicial interpretation of section 109, state contract laws permit the section 109 limitation on the copyright owner's exclusive rights to be
avoided.
However, both common and statutory state law in another similar
area have been held preempted. Section 11762 permits the owner of a
copy of a computer program to make copies of the program for two purposes: (1) to use the program on a computer, since loading a program
into a computer involves making a copy, and (2) to back up a piece of
software, i.e., to make a copy of the program to be stored on a separate
medium from the original copy in case the program is accidentally
erased from the original copy. These two provisions in section 117 place
limitations on the computer program copyright owner's exclusive right
to make copies of its copyrighted work. A third limitation in section 117
limits the copyright owner's exclusive right to create derivative works,
by permitting the owner of a copy of a computer program to modify the
program for use on the purchaser's computer. Can the copyright owner,
by contractual provision, forbid the purchaser of the copy from loading
the program into the computer or from making a backup copy? If section 117 is given application analogous to that given section 109, the
copyright holder may avoid the section 117 limitations.
However, in Vault Corp. v. QuaidSoftware Limited, both the Louisiana District Court and the Fifth Circuit answered the question in the
negative. 63 The court determined that at least some aspects of Louisiana's Software License Enforcement Act (SLEA) were preempted by
federal copyright law. The SLEA validates the provisions contained in
many mass-marketed software license agreements, the so-called shrink
wrap agreements. The particular license agreement that was involved
in Vault prohibited, among other things, copying software for back up
says "This does not mean that conditions on future disposition of copies or phonorecords,
imposed by a contract between their buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between
the parties as a breach of contract." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5693. Presumably,
the legislature contemplated that the copyright holder could sell copies with restrictions

on transfer.
61. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984);
American Int'l Pictures v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1191 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 977 (1977); Hampton v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 297 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Bily, 406 F.
Supp. 726, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D. Tex.
1959).

62. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
63. 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987), aff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Louisiana's
Software License Enforcement Act preempted by federal copyright law).
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purposes and modifying the software by reverse engineering or
decompilation.
Vault creates and markets computer programs that prevent the
software user from making a usable copy of the programs contained on
its encrypted diskette. The district court in Vault decided that Vault's
license agreement was "a contract of adhesion which could only be enforceable if the [SLEA] is a valid and enforceable statute." 64 The court
determined that the SLEA was preempted by federal copyright law.
Hence, under Vault, the copyright holder of the computer program may
not limit the owner's rights recognized in section 117 contractually, because section 117 preempts the state statute that validates the copyright
holder's contractual limitations. The holding of the Vault court on this
issue is not entirely consistent with the judicial application of section
109.
Finally, states are reserving to themselves the right to legislate on
the manner of marketing certain types of copyrighted works, such as is
65
being done with the motion picture licensing statutes.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Preemption of state law by federal regulation of copyright protection is an increasingly debated issue. Federal copyright law was held to
preempt some aspects of state law under the supremacy clause. However, the extent of that preemption was not clear from the Supreme
Court cases applying the preemption doctrine under the supremacy
clause. In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress acted to legislatively abolish state common law copyright protection and to clarify the preemptive
effect of the federal copyright law. Unfortunately, section 301 and its
legislative history do not clarify the extent of section 301's preemptive
effect for courts encountering the issue of preemption of various state
laws. The overriding consideration should be the balancing of the public interest in free competition and free dissemination of information
against the individual author's right to protect her economic interest in
her intellectual property.

64. Id. at 761.

65. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D.C. Utah 1981), dismissed and remanded, 782 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1985) (Utah's Motion Picture Fair Bidding
Act not preempted); Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D.
Pa. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982), on remand, 614 F. Supp. 1100
(E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 933 (1987) (Pennsylvania's similar act not preempted); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp.
408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982) (Ohio's similar act not preempted).

